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EQUAL PROTECTION, THE CONSCIENTIOUS JUDGE, AND
THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
JONATHAN L. ENTIN*
In Bush v. Gore,' the Supreme Court effectively resolved the 2000
presidential election by stopping the recount in Florida. 2 The Court
relied on the Equal Protection Clause in support of this result.3 Seven
of the nine Justices concluded that county-by-county variations in vote-
counting procedures raised equal protection concerns.4 Only five,
however, supported an immediate cessation of counting on the theory
that there was insufficient time to conduct the recount in a constitu-
tionally acceptable fashion.5 For all practical purposes, then, Bush v.
Gore was a 5-4 ruling.
For the chattering and scribbling class, this decision has taken on
a Rashomon-like air: those who favored the election of Texas Governor
George W. Bush generally praised the ruling, whereas those who pre-
ferred Vice President Al Gore denounced it.6 Some of the critics ac-
cused the Court's five-member majority of acting in an unprincipled,
* Professor of Law and Political Science, Case Western Reserve University. The au-
thor thanks Amy Miller for excellent research assistance.
1. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). For the sake of clarity, this decision hereinafter will be referred
to as Bush II.
2. Id. at 110-11 (per curiam).
3. Id. at 103. The per curiam opinion was apparently written by Justices O'Connor
and Kennedy, who did not subscribe to any of the other opinions. Justices Scalia and
Thomas joined ChiefJustice Rehnquist's concurrence. Id. at 111 (Rehnquist, C.J., concur-
ring). Justices Ginsburg and BreyerjoinedJustice Stevens's dissent. Id at 123 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Justice Souter's dissent was joined in full by Justice Breyer and in part by
Justices Stevens and Ginsburg. Id. at 129 (Souter, J., dissenting).
4. See id. at 111 (per curiam). In addition to the drafters of the per curiam opinion,
ChiefJustice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, agreed that the vote-count-
ing procedures raised equal protection concerns. See id at 111 (Rehnquist, C.J., concur-
ring). However, these Justices went on to conclude that the Florida Supreme Court's
recount order violated Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution by interfering with the state
legislature's authority to determine the method for selecting presidential electors. Id at
115. This Article will not directly address the Article II argument except to the extent that
it affects the discussion of equal protection.
Justices Souter and Breyer also agreed that the case posed equal protection concerns.
Id. at 134 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 145-46 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
5. Id. at 110-11 (per curiam). Justices Souter and Breyer thought that there was suffi-
cient time to conduct an acceptable recount. Id. at 134-35 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at
146 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
6. See, e.g., BUSH V. GORE: THE COURT CASES AND THE COMMENTARY 281-341 (E.J.
Dionne,Jr. & William Kristol eds., 2001); HOwARD GiLLMAN, THE VOTES THAT COUNTED 51-
63 (2001).
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even corrupt, fashion to deliver the presidency to their preferred can-
didate.7 Even commentators who favored the result found the major-
ity's equal protection theory less than entirely convincing.8
The attack has run along the following lines. First, the majority's
equal protection analysis was novel: never before had the Court sug-
gested that variations in vote-counting procedures raised constitu-
tional concerns.9 Second, it was far from clear that the variations that
did exist were based on invidious factors, such as a desire to disadvan-
tage supporters of one candidate or to disenfranchise voters of a par-
ticular race or ethnic group, that are typically required as a predicate
for finding an equal protection violation." Third, the majority's
novel and expansive approach in Bush v. Gore was surprising in light of
the generally restrictive approach to equal protection that these par-
ticular Justices have taken in other cases."1 Fourth, the weakness of
this theory is suggested by the Court's refusal even to entertain argu-
ments on equal protection in Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing
7. See, e.g., ALAN M. DERS-OW1TZ, SUPREME INJUSTICE: How THE HIGH COURT HIJACKED
ELECTION 2000 (2001). The tone of these attacks has itself come under criticism. See, e.g.,
RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION, THE CONSTITUTION, AND
THE COURTS 198-220 (2001); Peter Berkowitz & Benjamin Wittes, The Professors and Bush v.
Gore, WILSON Q., Autumn 2001, at 76.
8. See POSNER, supra note 7, at 128-30; Richard A. Epstein, "In Such Manner as the Legis-
lature Thereof May Direct". The Outcome in Bush v. Gore Defended, in THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE,
AND THE SUPREME COURT 13, 14-19 (Cass R. Sunstein & Richard A. Epstein eds., 2001);
Michael W. McConnell, Two-and-a-Half Cheers for Bush v. Gore, in THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE,
AND THE SUPREME COURT, supra, at 98, 117-20; Cass R. Sunstein, Order Without Law, in THE
VOTE: BUSH, GORE, AND THE SUPREME COURT, supra, at 205, 207, 213. But see Nelson Lund,
The Unbearable Rightness of Bush v. Gore, 23 CARDozo L. REv. (forthcoming May 2002) (en-
dorsing the majority's equal protection analysis).
9. See Bush II, 531 U.S. at 125 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[W]e have never before called
into question the substantive standard by which a State determines that a vote has been
legally cast."); Michael J. Klarman, Bush v. Gore Through the Lens of Constitutional History, 89
CAL. L. REV. 1721, 1727 (2001) (arguing that the Court's equal protection rationale "cre-
ates entirely new law" because it has never before implied that vague vote-counting stan-
dards violate the Equal Protection Clause).
10. See POSNER, supra note 7, at 128-29 (arguing that the Court's reliance on the equal
protection argument is not persuasive because differences in voting procedures has not
traditionally been actionable as a denial of equal protection); Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore
and the Boundary Between Law and Politics, 110 YALE L.J. 1407, 1427 (2001) (stating that the
Court did not claim that invidious factors entered the recount process); Epstein, supra note
8, at 16-17 (finding that "no one can identify the determinate class of individuals who
benefit from or are burdened by the choice of this or that standard for counting ballots").
11. See, e.g., DERSHOWITZ, supra note 7, at 128, 133-34, 138-39, 144-45, 147-48; Pamela S.
Karlan, The Newest Equal Protection: Regressive Doctrine on a Changeable Court, in THE VOTE,
BUSH, GORE, AND THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 8, at 77; David A. Strauss, Bush v. Gore:
What Were They Thinking, in THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE, AND THE SUPREME COURT, supra note
8, at 184, 187.
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Board,'2 the earlier phase of the Florida vote-counting litigation, 3 and
by the lack of priority given to the argument by Bush's lawyers in their
written submissions in Bush v. Gore.14 Fifth, while professing profound
concern over variations in vote-counting standards, the majority ap-
peared completely indifferent to the substantial county-by-county dif-
ferences in voting technology that had a much larger impact on the
election than did disparities in counting standards between counties
that used the same voting methods.1 5 Sixth, the remedy ordered by
the majority-an immediate halt to the count instead of a remand for
12. 531 U.S. 70, 73 (2000) (per curiam) [hereinafter Bush 1].
13. In Bush I, the Court granted review only on two questions:
[W]hether the decision of the Florida Supreme Court, by effectively changing the
State's elector appointment procedures after election day, violated the Due Pro-
cess Clause or 3 U.S.C. § 5, and whether the decision of that court changed the
manner in which the State's electors are to be selected, in violation of the legisla-
ture's power to designate the manner for selection under Art. II, § 1, cl. 2, of the
United States Constitution.
Id. The equal protection issue was presented as a third question. See Petition for Cert. at i,
Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000) (No. 00-836).
14. Bush's brief on the merits devoted slightly more than 5 of its 50 pages to equal
protection. See Brief for Petitioners at 40-45, Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (No.
00-949), LEXIS, 2000 U.S. Briefs 949. By way of comparison, that brief devoted 22 pages
to Article II and related arguments. Id. at 19-40. Indeed, in the Florida courts, Bush's
lawyers only reluctantly raised the equal protection issue and then almost "as an after-
thought." Klarman, supra note 9, at 1730; see also GILLMAN, supra note 6, at 186-87.
15. SeeBush II, 531 U.S. 98, 126 n.4 (2000) (Stevens,J., dissenting) ("The percentage of
nonvotes in this election in counties using a punch-card system was 3.92%; in contrast, the
rate of error under more modem optical-scan systems was only 1.43%."); id. at 147 (Breyer,
J., dissenting) (describing the inequity that results from different counties employing dif-
ferent voting systems); POSNER, supra note 7, at 128 (stating that different counties often
use different voting equipment, ballots, instructions, and procedures, which understanda-
bly results in a different rate of error); Balkin, supra note 10, at 1427-28 (contending that
the Supreme Court's decision is puzzling because it focuses on states creating uniform
manual recount procedures rather than "uniform technologies for counting votes"); Sa-
muel Issacharoff, Political Judgments, in THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE, AND THE SUPREME COURT,
supra note 8, at 55, 70 (arguing that "the disparity in the standards for counting contested
ballots, pales before other disparities in access to a meaningful vote, most notably the well-
documented failure of voting machines used in one part, but not in another, of many
states, Florida included"); Karlan, supra note 11, at 90 (stating that the Court acknowl-
edged the need for a uniform standard with respect to the manual recount, but it failed to
address the problems that stemmed from Florida's use of unequal voting technologies
throughout the state); Klarman, supra note 9, at 1729 ("One principal objective of the
court-ordered manual recount in Florida was the amelioration of inequalities that resulted
from the use of disparate voting technologies in different counties.").
Several studies have documented disparities in the error rates of different kinds of
voting technology. In particular, punch-card voting systems, which were used in many of
the Florida counties that were the subject of dispute in Bush v. Gore, are more likely than
others to fail to record votes accurately. See, e.g., CALTECH/MIT VOTING TECHNOLOGY PRO-
JECT, VOTING: WHAT IS-WHAT COULD BE 20-22 (2001); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
ELECTIONS: STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF FACTORS THAT AFFECTED UNCOUNTED VOTES IN THE
2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 7-9 (2001) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]; see also MARTIN
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further tabulation using appropriate standards-appeared strikingly
inconsistent with a genuine concern for equal protection. 6 Finally,
language in the majority opinion purporting to limit the ruling's prec-
edential value1 7 implied to some observers that the decision was, as
Justice Roberts put it in an earlier election case to which we shall re-
turn, "good for this day and train only."' 8
This Article seeks to transcend the debate over the correctness
and legitimacy of the per curiam opinion that spoke for the five-mem-
ber majority in Bush v. Gore. For better or worse, that decision is on
the books. The opinion's reasoning must stand or fall on its merits,
not on the motivations of the Justices who wrote or subscribed to it.' 9
MERZER ET AL., THE MIAI HERALD REPORT: DEMOCRACY HELD HOSTAGE 53-63 (2001) (dis-
cussing the history of punch-card balloting).
16. See Bush II, 531 U.S. at 135 (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that there was no justifi-
cation for denying Florida the right to count the disputed ballots); id. at 146-47 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that there was no justification for halting the recount, and by doing
so, the majority "harms the very fairness interests the Court is attempting to protect"); see
also id. at 126-27 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating the appropriate decision would have
been to remand the case, and noting that a desire for speed is not a sufficient reason to
deny constitutional equal protection guarantees); id. at 143-44 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the Court's decision to halt the recount was based on its own judgments
about the feasibility of a recount, rather than on the opinions of people closer to the
process). Commentators of diverse views shared this concern. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note
10, at 1429-31; McConnell, supra note 8, at 117-20; Strauss, supra note 11, at 187-89.
17. See Bush II, 531 U.S. at 109 (per curiam) ("Our consideration is limited to the
present circumstances, for the problem of equal protection in election processes generally
presents many complexities.").
18. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 669 (1944) (Roberts,J., dissenting). See, e.g., DER-
SHOWITZ, supra note 7, at 81-84 (noting that the Court clearly desired to limit the prece-
dential value of the decision because if they did not do so, every close election would stand
the chance of being invalidated); GILLMAN, supra note 6, at 162-63 ("[Tlhe fact that the
majority made it a point to say that its discussion on key points may only apply in this
special case was more evidence that the commitment to those principles was political
rather than principled."); Issacharoff, supra note 15, at 70 (stating that it is especially diffi-
cult to grasp the scope of the majority's new equal protection right because the Court
limited its ruling in a way that exposes that right "as a cynical vessel used to engage in
result-orientedjudging by decree"); Strauss, supra note 11, at 198-99 (pointing out that the
Court went out of its way to narrow its holding to the facts of Bush v. Gore not because the
majority was unconcerned with principle, but rather because they questioned the motives
of the Florida Supreme Court).
Indeed, some critics have seized on this fact as evidence of the majority's partisan
motivations and maintained that those Justices ruled as they did only because the decision
benefited Bush; had the situation been reversed, they would not have issued a decision
favorable to Gore. See GILLMAN, supra note 6, at 188-90; Balkin, supra note 10, at 1429-35;
Klarman, supra note 9, at 1725; cf POSNER, supra note 7, at 180 (rejecting the accusation of
blatant partisanship but conceding that ideology might have made the majority Justices
more sympathetic to Governor Bush's arguments than they otherwise would have been).
19. By way of disclosure, I was one of the many supposed experts who told reporters
that the Court should not involve itself in the Florida dispute. After the Justices granted
review in Bush I, 531 U.S. 70 (2000) (per curiam), I expressed the "hope that the Court will
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Accordingly, this Article considers whether a conscientious judge, rea-
soning in good faith, could have reached the same conclusion as did
the Bush v. Gore majority. It answers that question tentatively in the
affirmative: there is a respectable argument for the result, but reasona-
ble people could legitimately disagree with every aspect of the major-
ity's analysis.
The discussion proceeds as follows. Parts I and II provide neces-
sary background, summarizing the Court's reasoning and examining
some of the cases from which the majority constructed its equal pro-
tection theory. Part III addresses the narrowness of the result, focus-
ing on the seemingly ironic fact that the Court vindicated its theory by
ending the Florida count instead of requiring a properly conducted
tabulation. This section considers both the conventional wisdom that
the history of voting rights has been one of consistent expansion and
the more general issue of how to remedy an equal protection viola-
tion. Part IV assesses the contention that, whatever the defects of the
majority's reasoning, the result can be defended as a form of "rough
justice" in the face of an imminent constitutional crisis.
I. EQUAL PROTECTION IN BUSH V. GoRE
Before turning to the majority's equal protection analysis, it is
helpful to review how Bush v. Gore reached the Supreme Court. Due
to the closeness of the Florida vote,2° an automatic recount was con-
ducted as required by the Florida election code.2" Vice President
Gore sought manual recounts in three counties pursuant to the statu-
tory procedure for filing a protest.22 Secretary of State Katherine Har-
ris ruled that those counties were required to file their returns within
seven days of the election, but the Florida Supreme Court unani-
mously held that she had abused her discretion and extended the fil-
speak with one voice. A split decision along party or ideological lines, or a fragmented set
of separate opinions, will feed public cynicism that the Justices are simply politicians in
black robes." Jonathan L. Entin, Legal Issues in Presidential Election 2000, Address at the
City Club of Cleveland 2 (Dec. 1, 2000) (transcript on file with author). Once the Court
took the Bush I case, I saw little likelihood that it would decline to take Bush II, but contin-
ued to hope for a less divisive outcome.
20. The initial count was 2,909,135 for Bush and 2,907,351 for Gore, a margin of 1784
votes or 0.03%. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 100 (per curiam).
21. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.141(4) (West Supp. 2002) (amended 2002) (requiring
the county canvassing board to order a recount if it appears that a candidate was defeated
or eliminated by one-half of one percent or less).
22. See id. § 102.166(4) (a) (amended 2002) (permitting any candidate appearing on
the ballot to file a written request with the canvassing board for a manual recount).
[VOL. 61:576
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ing deadline an additional twelve days, until November 26.23 The
local recounts continued, although Miami-Dade County never com-
pleted its tabulation.24 Secretary Harris certified Bush as the winner
in Florida shortly after the extended deadline passed.25 Gore then
filed a contest action in state court to challenge Harris's certification
of the result.
26
Meanwhile, the United States Supreme Court, at Bush's behest,
granted review of the Florida Supreme Court's extension of the dead-
line.27 The order granting certiorari explicitly declined to consider
Bush's equal protection arguments.2" On December 4, three days af-
ter oral argument, the Court vacated the Florida ruling and remanded
for clarification of the basis for that decision. 29 The unanimous per
curiam opinion specifically referred to the potentially preemptive ef-
fect of Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution.3 °
Gore's contest action was rejected by the trial court, but a divided
Florida Supreme Court reversed on December 8.31 The four-justice
majority held that the trial judge had applied the wrong legal stan-
dard in dismissing Gore's suit 32 and ordered the recount to con-
tinue.33 Bush immediately sought review in the United States
Supreme Court, which granted a stay that stopped further counting
on December 9.34 Oral arguments were held on December 11, and
the case was decided late in the evening of December 12.
The per curiam opinion, which relied exclusively on equal pro-
tection, began by observing that there is no federal right to vote in
presidential elections but that when a state provides for popular vote
in such elections (as every state has done), principles of equality come
into play.35 Moreover, the state must structure its election so as not to
23. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1240 (Fla. 2000)
(per curiam), vacated sub noma. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70
(2000) [hereinafter Harris 1].
24. See Bush II, 531 U.S. at 101-02 (per curiam).
25. Id. at 101.
26. Id.
27. Bush 1, 531 U.S. 70, 73 (2000) (per curiam).
28. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
29. Bush I, 531 U.S. at 78.
30. Id. at 77.
31. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1262 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam), rev'd sub nom. Bush
v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) [hereinafter Harris I1].
32. Id. at 1252.
33. Id. at 1262.
34. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046 (2000). Justice Scalia issued a three-paragraph concur-
ring statement, id. at 1046-47, while Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg,
and Breyer, issued a four-paragraph dissent. Id. at 1047-48.
35. See Bush II, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (per curiam).
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arbitrarily weigh one person's vote more than another's.36 The opin-
ion then proceeded to the heart of the matter. Even if the state courts
had authority under Article II to resolve disputes involving the presi-
dential election-a question that need not be decided 37-the ruling
of the Florida Supreme Court had to be set aside because it failed to
provide "specific standards" to promote "equal application" in the
county-by-county recounts."
The opinion identified several specific defects that raised equal
protection concerns. First, the absence of clear standards for deter-
mining a legal vote meant that some counties might use a relatively
strict standard while others were using a more permissive one. 9 Sec-
ond, at least one county changed its standard during the course of the
count, and there was variation between counting teams in the same
county.4 ° Third, there were differences in the ballots that were being
counted: some counties looked only at undervotes, others included
overvotes in their review.4" Fourth, the hazy procedures authorized by
the Florida Supreme Court allowed the inclusion of numbers based
on incomplete recounts, thereby leaving out whatever results might
have come from examining all of the subject ballots.42 Finally, the
magnitude of the task and the short time available within which to
complete it necessitated the hiring of inexperienced and untrained
election judges whose work would be subject to observation but not
objection by other persons." The fault for all this lay with the Florida
Supreme Court, which had "the power to assure uniformity" but failed
to do so." Accordingly, "the rudimentary requirements of equal
treatment and fundamental fairness [were not] satisfied."45
Justices Souter and Breyer shared the majority's equal protection
concerns.46 Souter expressed a willingness to tolerate local variations
in voting technology, but was troubled by inconsistencies in the treat-
ment of the same kind of ballots.47 Breyer also found the absence of
36. Id. at 104-05.
37. Id. at 105. As indicated above, the concurring opinion by ChiefJustice Rehnquist,
joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, did address Article II and concluded that the state
court had overstepped its authority. See supra note 4.
38. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 106.
39. Id. at 107.
40. Id. at 106-07.
41. Id. at 107-08.
42. Id. at 108.
43. Id. at 109.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 134 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 145 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 134 (Souter, J., dissenting).
[VOL. 61:576
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uniform standards to be constitutionally disturbing.48 Their agree-
ment with the majority ended at this point, however, because they be-
lieved that there was still time to try to complete a proper count.
4 9
On the question of remedy, the per curiam concluded that noth-
ing could be done.50 Finding that the Florida legislature wanted to
take advantage of the safe-harbor provision of the Electoral Count
Act,5" the majority held that it would be impossible to finish the re-
count according to procedures that met the requirements of equal
protection by the safe-harbor day, which just happened to be the very
day that the case was decided. 52 Suggestions to allow counting to con-
tinue until December 18, when the Electoral College would meet,
were therefore not legally "appropriate. 53
II. VOTING RIGHTS PRECEDENTS
In holding that the recount procedures authorized by the Florida
Supreme Court violated principles of equal protection, the per
curiam opinion invoked four precedents. None of those cases dealt
with the issues raised in Bush v. Gore, although they did contain lan-
guage and reasoning that might have supported greater judicial con-
cern about vote-counting variations.
The first case, Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,54 found that
poll taxes violate the Fourteenth Amendment because they discrimi-
nate based on wealth, a factor that is unrelated to qualification for
voting.55 The Bush v. Gore majority cited Harper for the proposition
that states "may not, by later arbitrary and disparate treatment, value
one person's vote over that of another."56
A difficulty arises because the situations in the two cases are not
analogous. In Harper, the inability to pay the poll tax of $1.50 per year
completely disqualified a person from voting.57 Moreover, although
the Court did not make the point explicitly, there is some reason to
suspect that the poll tax was used for the purpose of systematically
48. Id. at 145-46 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 135 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 146 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 110 (per curiam).
51. 3 U.S.C. § 5 (2000). This is the so-called "safe harbor" provision, and it provides
that once a state has made a "final determination of any controversy.., at least six days
before" the electors meet, the determination is conclusive. Id.
52. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 110 (per curiam).
53. Id. at 111.
54. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
55. Id. at 666.
56. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 104-05 (per curiam).
57. Harper, 383 U.S. at 664 n.1, 668.
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biasing election results.5' The poll tax was more likely to affect less
affluent persons who could least afford to pay, and less affluent voters
might be expected to have somewhat different political preferences
than their richer neighbors.59 In Bush v. Gore, on the other hand,
there is no reason to suspect that variations in vote-counting standards
were intended to skew election results in any particular direction.6 °
There does not seem to be any evidence that the selection of any par-
ticular vote-counting standard was designed to favor one candidate or
discriminate against an identifiable voting group. 61 At least the Court
failed to cite such evidence if it existed.
Perhaps recognizing the weakness of the analogy to Harper, the
majority quickly moved on to Reynolds v. Sims,62 which held that both
branches of state legislatures must be apportioned on the basis of pop-
ulation.6" The per curiam opinion in Bush quoted language in Reyn-
olds which warned that "the right of suffrage can be denied by a
debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen's vote just as effec-
tively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise."64
This language is closer to the mark, but there is still a large gap be-
tween the two cases.
Reynolds dealt with a legislature that had not been redistricted in
more than sixty years despite a state constitutional requirement for
decennial reapportionment6 5 and where barely one-fourth of the vot-
ers could elect a majority of both houses.66 These facts suggested that
the system for choosing state legislators was systematically biased in
58. See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOC-
RACY IN THE UNITED STATES 228 (2000) (stating that the poll tax helped to disenfranchise
virtually all blacks and many poor whites).
59. See id. at 236-37 (describing how the movement to abolish the poll tax in the late
1920s was "galvanized by southern white liberals" to "enfranchise poor whites and blacks,
democratize politics in the South, and hasten the downfall of conservatives"). Although
Harper does not directly discuss this point, there is good historical evidence that the poll
tax was designed to deter African-Americans from voting. See infra note 96 and accompany-
ing text (describing the discriminatory effects of literacy tests, poll taxes, residency require-
ments, and complex voting procedures on African-American voters).
60. See Epstein, supra note 8, at 16 (stating that Bush v. Gore does not amount to "electo-
ral skewing" because "there is no conscious form of ex ante discrimination").
61. Id. at 16-17 (stating that the standards for vote counting did not appear to benefit
or burden any one determinate class, nor was there "one standard ... used for Gore voters
and another for Bush voters").
62. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
63. Id. at 568.
64. Bush II, 531 U.S. 98, 105 (2000) (per curiam) (quoting Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555).
65. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 53940.
66. Id. at 545.
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favor of particular interests or groups.67 The situation in Bush v. Gore
looks quite different. The per curiam opinion cited no evidence sup-
porting the hypothesis that county-by-county variations in counting
standards (or even intra-county variations) systematically pushed the
tally in one direction or another.68
Later in the opinion, the majority cited Gray v. Sanders69 and
Moore v. Ogilvie7° for the proposition that a state may not afford "arbi-
trary and disparate treatment to voters in its different counties. "71
Both of these cases, however, also dealt with systematic efforts to skew
the voting process. Gray invalidated the so-called county unit rule,
under which nominations for statewide offices were determined on
the basis of how many unit votes candidates received rather than on
the basis of how many popular votes they got. Each county was as-
signed a certain number of units, the candidate who carried a county
received all of that county's units, and the winner had to receive a
majority of the unit votes statewide. 72 Counties containing one-third
of the population controlled a majority of the units and therefore had
effective control over the nominating process.73
Moore struck down an Illinois law that required new political par-
ties seeking to qualify for the ballot to get approximately 25,000 signa-
tures and to obtain a minimum of 200 signatures from each of fifty
counties.74 At the time, 93.4% of the state's voters resided in only 49
counties, whereas 6.6% lived in the remaining 53 counties.75 The
Court found that the statute discriminated against those residing in
populous counties and therefore violated the Fourteenth
Amendment.76
In both cases, therefore, the state had adopted political ground
rules that systematically favored smaller counties. The per curiam
opinion in Bush v. Gore, however, cited no evidence that Florida's vote-
counting variations were designed to give an advantage to any particu-
lar candidate or interest.
67. See id. at 563 (stating that people living in disfavored parts of the state do not have
the same right to vote as those living in the more favored parts of the state).
68. Epstein, supra note 8, at 16-17.
69. 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
70. 394 U.S. 814 (1969).
71. Bush II, 531 U.S. 98, 107 (2000) (per curiam).
72. Gray, 372 U.S. at 370-72. The system also contained complex tie-breaking rules
requiring the winner to receive a majority of the popular vote in the event that two candi-
dates received the same number of unit votes. Id. at 372.
73. Id. at 373.
74. Moore, 394 U.S. at 819.
75. Id. at 816.
76. Id, at 819.
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In short, the precise issue in Bush v. Gore had never been dealt
with before. Perhaps the haphazard counting rules were result-ori-
ented, at least in the sense that the party controlling the local canvass-
ing boards hoped its side would benefit from the recount, but the
majority opinion never said even that much. Lurking below the sur-
face might have been a sense that the whole operation in Florida
smacked of Keystone Kops, but incompetence and unconstitutionality
are not synonymous.77
III. THE CONSCIENTIOUS JUDGE AND THE MAJoITY's APPROACH
As we have seen, the relevant precedents did not clearly support
the majority's conclusion that variations in vote-counting standards
implicate the Equal Protection Clause. Yet the use of inconsistent
standards, which changed in at least one county while the recount was
still going on, does raise legitimate concerns about the arbitrariness
and possible lack of integrity of the process. 78 This does not look very
much like a traditional equal protection problem, but it does reflect a
concern for regularity in the selection of the nation's most powerful
official. 7 ' The concern is underscored by comparison with the han-
dling of another tight federal election that occurred at the same time
as the Florida dispute was unfolding. In the State of Washington, in-
cumbent Republican Senator Slade Gorton was locked in a close con-
test with his Democratic opponent, Maria Cantwell, for a seat that
would determine control of the Senate: if Gorton won, the GOP
would have a bare majority of fifty-one members; if Cantwell tri-
umphed, the upper chamber would be equally divided. In short, the
outcome of the Gorton-Cantwell race had serious implications for the
direction of the federal government no matter who won the presi-
dency. Despite the high stakes of that election, the recount pro-
ceeded with none of the contention that characterized the Florida
proceedings.8" If Washington was able to resolve a crucial election in
an orderly fashion, the argument goes, Florida should also have been
able to do so. The Sunshine State's inability to do this suggests a fail-
77. Cf. James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128, 133 (1972) ("Misguided laws may nonetheless be
constitutional.").
78. See Bush II, 531 U.S. 98, 106-07 (2000) (per curiam) (describing how the standard
in Palm Beach County changed over the course of the recount process, therefore question-
ing the equality of the process).
79. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, OUR SECRET CONSTITUTION: How LINCOLN REDEFINED
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 255-57 (2001).
80. Dionne Searcey, Recount Without Rancor: A Country Away, Washington's Tally Hums
Along, WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 2000, at A25.
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ure of state procedures of sufficient magnitude that federal constitu-
tional intervention might be appropriate.
The preceding argument rests on a series of controversial as-
sumptions about the Florida situation, particularly that the Florida Su-
preme Court had failed to provide adequate standards for conducting
the recount. For the dissenting Justices as well as many critics, how-
ever, the principal difficulty with the majority opinion was its insis-
tence on shutting down the count immediately rather than allowing
Florida authorities to work under proper standards."' Let us there-
fore focus on this issue, which goes to the heart of the controversy
about Bush v. Gore.
There are two aspects to the remedial issue. One has to do with
how expansively we view the right to vote, the other with how to re-
solve an equal protection violation. The next two sections suggest that
a restrictive remedy could be defended as a matter of principle, al-
though such a conclusion is certainly not obvious.
A. Restrictive Views of Suffrage
One way to understand the restrictive remedy in Bush v. Gore is to
focus on how user-friendly the majority Justices believe the voting sys-
tem should be. Although those Justices did not expressly address this
subject, there are hints that they had little sympathy for voters who
were unable to cast their ballots properly. For example, Chief Justice
Rehnquist questioned whether it was "reasonable" to count a vote as
lawfully cast "when electronic or electromechanical equipment . . .
fails to count those votes that are not marked in the manner that
[the] voting instructions explicitly and prominently specify." 2 Simi-
larly, at oral argument an exasperated Justice O'Connor asked: "Well,
why isn't the standard the one that voters are instructed to follow, for
goodness sakes? I mean, it couldn't be clearer. I mean, why don't we
go to that standard?"8 " Finally, the per curiam opinion expressed
skepticism about the reliability of hand recounts because "the stan-
dards for accepting or rejecting contested ballots might vary not only
from county to county but indeed within a single county from one recount
team to another."4 In other words, voters who fail to comply with the
81. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
82. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 119 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
83. Transcript of Oral Argument, Bush I, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (No. 00-949), 2000 U.S.
Trans. LEXIS 80, at *57.
84. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 106 (per curiam) (emphasis added). The emphasized language
might be taken to mean that hand recounts are unconstitutional due to the inevitable
subjectivity of the persons examining the ballots. The majority is unlikely to have intended
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rules and cast their ballots in a way that the technology cannot process
have no grounds for complaining if their votes are not counted.
To be sure, most states follow a more forgiving approach. 5 For
that matter, so does the National Labor Relations Board in its supervi-
sion of union representation elections.8 6 But this fact does not neces-
sarily undermine the validity of the stricter view. Consider the debate
over the National Voter Registration Act, better known as the Motor
Voter Law.8 7 Opponents have consistently attacked this measure as an
invitation to electoral fraud and argued for greater restrictions on eli-
gibility. 8 It is not necessary to resolve the merits of the debate about
Motor Voter to recognize that there remains a respectable argument
against excessively easy electoral participation. Indeed, the very idea
of universal suffrage has been a topic of perennial debate in this coun-
try.8 9 Although the Supreme Court has discerned "a continuing ex-
pansion of the scope of the right of suffrage in this country,"9" the
record is decidedly mixed.
such a strong reading, however, because that reasoning would effectively outlaw paper bal-
lots, which are still used in many parts of the country. See MERZER ET AL., supra note 15, at
72-73 (reporting that 13% of U.S. counties used paper ballots in 1998); GAO REPORT, supra
note 15, at 7 (noting that 9% of U.S. counties used paper ballots in the 2000 election).
85. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 124 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing statutes from thirty-two
states in addition to Florida that use more generous vote-counting standards). State courts
have applied standards similar to Florida's in a surprisingly large number of cases. One
example that received widespread attention during the 2000 presidential brouhaha is Dela-
hunt v.Johnston, 671 N.E.2d 1241 (Mass. 1996), in which the Massachusetts Supreme Court
examined nearly 1000 punch-card ballots and affirmed a trial judge's ruling that many of
them contained valid votes even though they had not been counted by the tabulating ma-
chines, thus changing the outcome of a congressional primary election. Id. at 1243. Other
examples of generous county standards abound. See, e.g., Finkelstein v. Stout, 774 P.2d 786
(Alaska 1989); Pullen v. Mulligan, 561 N.E.2d 585, 609-13 (Ill. 1990); Wright v. Gettinger,
428 N.E.2d 1212 (Ind. 1981); Duffy v. Martenson, 497 N.W.2d 437 (S.D. 1983).
86. See NLRB v. Americold Logistics, Inc., 214 F.3d 935, 939 (7th Cir. 2000) (demon-
strating the NLRB's willingness to consider the intent behind a vote improperly cast); TCI
West, Inc. v. NLRB, 145 F.3d 1113, 1115 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing the policy of the NLRB as
that when a voter's intent is clear despite irregularities in the voter's mark, the ballot
should be counted); NLRB v. Duriron Co., 978 F.2d 254, 257 (6th Cir. 1992) ("A ballot
should normally be counted if there is a clear expression of preference, regardless of an
irregularity in the voter's mark."); Wackenhut Corp. v. NLRB, 666 F.2d 464, 467 (11th Cir.
1982) (discussing the court's acceptance of the NLRB's policy of "counting irregularly
marked ballots whenever the intent of the voter is clearly apparent").
87. 42 U.S.C. §§ 19 7 3 gg to 197 3gg-10 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
88. See, e.g., Christopher S. "Kit" Bond, "Motor Voter" Out of Control, WASH. POST, June
27, 2001, at A25 (discussing flaws in the accuracy and maintenance of voter rolls resulting
from attempts to comply with the motor voter legislation).
89. See, e.g., KEvsSAR, supra note 58, at 223-315 (discussing the checkered history of
universal suffrage in the United States).
90. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964) (footnote omitted).
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Consider first the issue of voting rights for African-Americans.
This is an appropriate place to begin because of the controversy over
whether Florida's electoral system discriminated along racial and eth-
nic lines in connection with the 2000 presidential election.91 Before
the Civil War, of course, most African-Americans were slaves. Even
free blacks, however, confronted significant barriers to voting. When
they were not barred from the franchise, they often had to satisfy
more stringent eligibility requirements than did whites.92 The adop-
tion of the Fifteenth Amendment after the Civil War did not guaran-
tee voting rights for African-Americans. The Supreme Court
construed Reconstruction civil rights laws so narrowly that efforts to
intimidate blacks seeking to exercise the franchise went unpun-
ished.9" Not until 1915 did the Court actually invalidate a state law
under the Fifteenth Amendment.94 Meanwhile, white Redeemers
regained power in the South as Reconstruction came to a close.95 Be-
ginning in 1890, Redeemer governments began a systematic effort to
disenfranchise African-Americans using devices such as literacy tests,
poll taxes, stringent residency requirements, and complex registration
and voting procedures, most of which were subject to discretionary,
and therefore discriminatory, enforcement by racist white officials.96
91. This issue divided the United States Commission on Civil Rights, which issued a
report, over two dissents, contending that discrimination against minorities was widespread
during the 2000 election in Florida. Compare UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
VOTING IRREGULARITIES IN FLORIDA DURING THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION (2001), with
THE FLORIDA ELECTION REPORT: DISSENTING STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER ABIGAIL THERN-
STROM AND COMMISSIONER RUSSELL G. REDENBAUGH (2001), and JOHN R. Lorr, JR., NON-
VOTED BALLOTS AND DISCRIMINATION IN FLORIDA (Yale Law School Program for Studies in
Law, Economics, and Pubic Policy, Research Paper No. 256, 2001) (report to the dissent-
ing members of the Civil Rights Commission).
92. See KEYSsAR, supra note 58, at 54-60 (discussing various antebellum efforts to disen-
franchise African-Americans).
93. See, e.g., United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 555-56 (1875) (reversing convic-
tions of conspiring to injure, oppress, threaten, and intimidate two African-American vot-
ers because the indictment failed to allege that the defendants were motivated by racial
animus); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 220-21 (1875) (striking down key provisions
of the Enforcement Act of 1870 for exceeding congressional power under the Fifteenth
Amendment).
94. Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 364-65 (1915) (voiding an Oklahoma grand-
father clause because it violated the Fifteenth Amendment); Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S.
368, 380 (1915) (striking down a Maryland statute that established qualifications for voting
that excluded African-Americans from voting).
95. See generally ERIc FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION,
1863-1877, at 587-601 (1988).
96. See generally KEYSSAR, supra note 58, at 111-16; J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF
SOUTHERN POLITICS: SUFFRAGE RESTRICTIONS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY
SOUTH, 1880-1910 (1974); C. VANN WOODWARD, ORIGINS OF THE NEW SOUTH 331-49
(1951). Note that poll taxes have now been effectively eliminated. U.S. CONST. amend.
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The Supreme Court's 1915 rulings dealt with only one of the dis-
enfranchisement schemes, the so-called grandfather clause. The
grandfather clause exempted from other registration requirements
those men who were eligible to vote before the adoption of the Fif-
teenth Amendment or who were descended from such men (recall
that the Nineteenth Amendment would not take effect until 1920).9'
Even those rulings were easily circumvented.98
At the same time, in a series of cases from Texas, the Court strug-
gled with the problem of the white primary, under which African-
Americans were excluded from participating in the Democratic pri-
mary, the only election that mattered in the Solid South. 9 Invalidat-
ing state laws forbidding blacks from voting in primaries was easy and
unanimous in Nixon v. Herndon,'°° but the road soon became bump-
ier. Justice Holmes's opinion in Herndon emphasized that the state
could not use race as "the basis of a statutory classification affecting
the right [to vote],"' ' so the legislature withdrew from regulating
primaries and instead authorized political parties to set their own
membership requirements.
10 2
In Nixon v. Condon, a 5-4 Court held that a party executive com-
mittee could not exclude blacks; only the party convention could
make such policies.10 3 The Texas Democratic Convention responded
with alacrity by adopting a whites-only membership rule, which the
Court unanimously upheld in Grovey v. Townsend."°4 The party's deci-
sion was not state action, Justice Roberts explained, as the party had
set its own membership requirement; the whites-only primary was con-
ducted by the party with no direct governmental support.10 5 This last
point became the basis for overruling Grovey less than a decade later.
XXIV (outlawing poll taxes in federal elections); supra notes 54-61 and accompanying text
(discussing Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections).
97. See BERNARD GROFMAN ET AL., MINORITY REPRESENTATION AND THE QUEST FOR VOT-
ING EQuALITY 9 (1992) (discussing the use of the grandfather clause to allow illiterate
whites to vote without passing the literacy tests that were used to disenfranchise blacks).
98. For example, Oklahoma responded to the Court's ruling in Guinn by requiring
anyone who had not voted in 1914, but was otherwise qualified to do so, to register within a
twelve-day period or forever forfeit the franchise. See Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275-76
(1939). This draconian requirement survived for nearly a quarter-century before the Su-
preme Court struck it down. Id. at 277.
99. GROFMAN ET AL., supra note 97, at 9.
100. 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
101. Id. at 541.
102. Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 81-82 (1932).
103. Id. at 84-85, 88-89.
104. 295 U.S. 45 (1935).
105. Id. at 48, 50.
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In Smith v. Allwright,'0 6 where Justice Roberts complained about
decisions "good for this day and train only," ' 7 the Court found the
necessary state action in the statutes that authorized and structured
primary elections." 8 By allowing a whites-only party to select candi-
dates for the general election, those laws effectively gave the state's
imprimatur to the party's racial discrimination. 9
There are several useful lessons in the story of the white primary.
First, the Supreme Court proceeded in fits and starts in dealing with
this phenomenon. It began by rejecting statutes that defined voter
eligibility in explicitly racial terms, but later rulings reached inconsis-
tent results and were often cast in fairly narrow terms that gave com-
fort to proponents of a more restricted franchise. Second, although
Smith v. Allwright did not eliminate efforts to keep African-Americans
from voting in primary elections,' it did facilitate black voting in
some areas."' Nevertheless, numerous other obstacles kept blacks
from registering to vote for many years afterward. Not until passage of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 did African-Americans in the South gain
effective suffrage.' "2
This brief history of black voting rights has implications beyond
the racial context. In one of the grandfather clause cases, for exam-
ple, the Court saw no constitutional infirmity in a requirement that
voters be taxpayers,"' and as late as 1959, in a unanimous ruling, the
Court could not find any basis for striking down a literacy require-
106. 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
107. Id. at 669 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
108. Smith, 321 U.S. at 664.
109. Id. at 664-65.
110. In 1953, the Court struck down a scheme under which a private, whites-only club
effectively controlled the local Democratic Party, although none of the three opinions sup-
porting the judgment commanded a majority. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
111. See Michael J. Klarman, The White Primary Rulings: A Case Study in the Consequences of
Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 55, 69 (2001) (explaining that the Smith
decision "contributed significantly to the dramatic increase in Southern black voter regis-
tration that took place in the middle and late 1940s"); see alsoJonathan L. Entin, Litigation,
Political Mobilization, and Social Reform: Insights from Hoida's Pre-Brown Civil Rights Era, 52
FLA. L. REV. 497, 500-01, 521 (2000).
112. See generally STEVEN F. LAWSON, IN PURSUIT OF POWER: SOUTHERN BLACKS AND ELEC-
TORAL POLITICS, 1965-1982 (1985).
113. Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368, 379 (1915). The Court wrote:
We put all question of the constitutionality of this standard out of view as it con-
tains no express discrimination repugnant to the Fifteenth Amendment and it is
not susceptible of being assailed on account of an alleged wrongful motive on the
part of the lawmaker or the mere possibilities of its future operation in
practice ....
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ment for voting." 4 In both instances, the Court was careful to point
out that there was no reason to believe that these requirements were
pretexts for racial discrimination, implying that a different result
would have been reached if there had been evidence of biased admin-
istration.11 In fact, the 1959 case cited residence, age, and criminal
record as "obvious examples" of permissible voting criteria."1 6
The Court's apparent tolerance for racially neutral voting re-
quirements reflects America's continuing ambivalence about universal
suffrage. It was not only race, after all, that prevented many people
from voting in this country. Gender is another notable example that
had to be addressed with a constitutional amendment.'17 Widespread
property qualifications for voting existed at the time of the Revolu-
tion, but they were gradually replaced by taxpaying requirements by
the middle of the nineteenth century.' Property was thought to
demonstrate a voter's independence, whereas taxpaying symbolized
membership in the political community."i 9 Still, the democratic im-
pulse that led to the demise of freeholder requirements also eventu-
ally undermined taxpayer rules. 12 0 The expansion of the franchise in
the decades before the Civil War was not uniform, though. This pe-
riod saw the enactment of laws that forbade paupers, criminals, and
newcomers from voting.1 2' The first literacy requirements were also
adopted before the Civil War, as were restrictions on voting rights for
naturalized citizens. 122 It was at this time that the Supreme Court
ruled, in Luther v. Borden,123 that disputes arising under the Guarantee
Clause124 are not justiciable. 125 That case arose as an outgrowth of a
long-running conflict over voting rights in Rhode Island. 126
114. Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
115. See id. at 51 (stating that the right to vote "is subject to the imposition of state
standards which are not discriminatory," and a literacy requirement is "neutral on race,
creed, color, and sex"); Myers, 238 U.S. at 379 (stating that "there is a reason other than
discrimination on account of race or color discernible upon which the [taxpayer] standard
may rest . . .").
116. Lassiter, 360 U.S. at 51.
117. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. See generally ELLEN CAROL DuBois, WOMAN SUFFRAGE
AND WOMEN'S RIGHTS (1998); KEYSSAR, supra note 58, at 54, 173-218.
118. KEYSSAR, supra note 58, at 28-29.
119. Id. at 29.
120. Id. at 50-52.
121. Id. at 61-65.
122. Id. at 86.
123. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
124. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
125. Luther, 48 U.S. at 39-41.
126. KExssAR, supra note 58, at 71-76 (tracing the sources of social and political conflict
underlying Luther v. Borden).
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The period between the Civil War and World War I also showed
the tension between expansive and restrictive approaches to suffrage.
A number of states adopted economic qualifications for voting in at
least some elections, 27 and significant restrictions on paupers contin-
ued. 128 Further restrictions were imposed on naturalized citizens, and
concerns about immigrant voting played a role in the adoption of re-
strictive federal immigration and naturalization laws. 129 Several states
outside the South adopted formal literacy tests;'3 0 in others, the adop-
tion of the Australian ballot owed much to the desire of good-govern-
ment advocates to restrict the political influence of less educated men
who would have difficulty marking a secret ballot."' 1 Two other re-
forms also restricted suffrage: durational residency requirements'
32
and formal systems of voter registration containing elaborate procedu-
ral mechanisms that discouraged or disqualified many potential elec-
tors. 3 ' Few significant changes occurred until the late 1950s.' By
the early 1970s, legislation, judicial rulings, and public opinion had
moved toward universal suffrage, at least in theory.1 35 Still, as the Mo-
tor Voter controversy suggests, not everyone believes in absolutely un-
127. Id. at 132-34.
128. Id. at 134-36. During this era, the definition of "pauper" was generally limited to
persons who were receiving public assistance at or very near election day, but even this
approach excluded large numbers of less affluent men from voting. Id. at 134-35.
129. Id. at 138-41.
130. Id. at 142.
131. Id. at 142-45. Professor Keyssar describes the effect of the Australian ballot as
follows:
For much of the nineteenth century, voters had obtained their ballots from politi-
cal parties: since the ballots generally contained only the names of an individual
party's candidates, literacy was not required. All that a man had to do was drop a
ballot in a box. Since ballots tended to be of different sizes, shapes and colors, a
man's vote was hardly a secret .... The Australian ballot was an effort to remedy
this situation and presumably the corruption and intimidation that flowed from
it: it was a standard ballot ... containing the names of all candidates for office;
the voter, often in private, placed a mark by the names of the candidates or par-
ties for whom he wished to vote.
Id at 142 (footnote omitted).
132. Id. at 148-51. The Supreme Court has since imposed stringent limits on durational
residency requirements for voting. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 348-49 (1972)
(striking down a Tennessee law that required an individual to live in the state for one year
before he or she could vote); see also Burns v. Fortson, 410 U.S. 686, 687 (1973) (per
curiam) (upholding a fifty-day residency requirement, but stating that this long a period
"approaches the outer constitutional limits in this area"); Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679
(1973) (per curiam) (upholding a fifty-day limit).
133. KEvssAR, supra note 58, at 152-59.
134. Id. at 256. One exception was the expansion of voting rights for soldiers during
World War II. Id. at 246.
135. See id. at 268-84 (discussing the gradual achievement of universal suffrage via the
elimination of economic and literacy barriers and long durational requirements).
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fettered voting rights. Today much of the debate focuses on voter
registration, which many observers regard as a bulwark of electoral
integrity and others condemn as an obstacle to meaningful political
participation. 1 
6
In short, this history suggests that there remains a respectable,
albeit limited, argument in favor of moderate restrictions on voting.
It does not imply that the Justices who subscribed to the per curiam
opinion in Bush v. Gore favor literacy tests, lengthy residency require-
ments, or some of the other stringent requirements that have long
since gone by the boards. Even under a system of liberal voter eligibil-
ity, a conscientious judge might still favor strict compliance with the
rules for casting ballots that count. This is especially so when the al-
ternative is a seemingly chaotic scheme of inconsistent and ever-
changing counting rules. Whether such rules implicate equal protec-
tion or some other constitutional value remains debatable, particu-
larly because of our traditional acceptance of local administration of
elections. The point is, though, that the issue is debatable.
B. Remedies for Equal Protection Violations
Granting the legitimacy of a modestly restrictive view of voting
does not necessarilyjustify the majority's restrictive remedy-stopping
the count. Preferring an admittedly incomplete and inaccurate tally
to a presumably more accurate one obtained using consistent stan-
dards seems incompatible with the idea of equal protection that
animated the per curiam opinion. 3 7
In fact, courts have two choices in fashioning remedies for equal
protection violations: they may either extend the benefit to the person
or group from whom it was improperly withheld, or they may remove
the benefit from the person or group to whom it was improperly
granted. 38 The former approach might be referred to as "leveling
up," the latter as "leveling down."' 39 The most influential judicial for-
mulation of this framework was given by Justice Harlan in a concur-
ring opinion in Welsh v. United States,'4 ° an important case that helped
to define the term "conscientious objector" under the military draft
law:
136. See NATIONAL COMM'N ON FEDERAL ELECTION REFORM, To AsSURE PRIDE AND CONFI-
DENCE IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 26-49 (2001); KEYSsAR, supra note 58, at 311-15.
137. The difficulties in identifying precisely who was harmed and how they would bene-
fit from the Court's remedy are explored in Karlan, supra note 11, at 83-90.
138. Id. at 89.
139. Id.
140. 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
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Where a statute is defective because of underinclusion there
exist two remedial alternatives: a court may either declare it a
nullity and order that its benefits not extend to the class that
the legislature intended to benefit, or it may extend the cov-
erage of the statute to include those who are aggrieved by
exclusion.14 1
Although Harlan regarded the statutory preference for adherents
to theistic religions over followers of nontheistic religions or secular
ethics as raising concerns under the Establishment Clause,' 42 he ap-
plied "an equal protection mode of analysis."' 43 Faced with the choice
of eliminating the exemption for conscientious objectors and ex-
panding its reach, Harlan opted for the expansive alternative.' 44
Leveling up was also typical in the Supreme Court's gender dis-
crimination cases. For example, Frontiero v. Richardson'45 invalidated a
statutory provision that required married female, but not married
male, members of the armed forces to establish their spouses' eco-
nomic dependency in order to qualify for increased housing and
health benefits.'46 Having concluded that this gender-based differen-
tial was unconstitutional, the Court excised the provision requiring
servicewomen to prove their husbands' dependency, meaning that all
married soldiers automatically qualified for the increased benefits.' 47
Similarly, Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld 48 struck down a provision of the
Social Security Act that awarded benefits to widows with child-care re-
sponsibilities but not to widowers with such duties.'49 In doing so, the
Court effectively deleted the gender references so that what had previ-
ously been a mother's benefit became a parent's benefit. 5 ° Most re-
cently, in United States v. Virginia,'5' the Court required the admission
of women to the Virginia Military Institute after finding that the
141. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
142. Id. at 356-57.
143. Id. at 357 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
144. Id. at 362-63.
145. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
146. Id. at 690-91.
147. See id. at 691 n.25.
148. 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
149. Id. at 653. According to the version of 42 U.S.C. § 4 0 2 (g) in effect at that time,
women and mothers were entitled to social security survivor benefits upon their husband's
death, but men and fathers were not covered by the act. Id. at 637-38 n.1.
150. See id. at 653.
151. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
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school's all-male admissions policy denied equal protection to
women.
15 2
The Court took a similar approach in Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel.
Williamson,1 53 perhaps the earliest case in the fundamental interests
strand of equal protection jurisprudence. Oklahoma's Habitual Crim-
inal Sterilization Act authorized sterilization for any person convicted
of a third felony "involving moral turpitude," but excluded embezzle-
ment and certain other offenses from its terms.' 54 Finding the line
between larceny and embezzlement to be "conspicuously artificial,"' 55
the Court invalidated the statute and relieved the defendant of the
prospect of sterilization.1
56
This expansive approach is not confined to individual rights
cases. A notable illustration is Iowa-Des Moines National Bank v. Ben-
nett,157 in which state officials erroneously assessed higher tax rates on
two corporations than were applied to domestic competitors. 151 In
fact, the local companies should have paid the higher rates assessed
on the corporate petitioners. 159 The Court, in an opinion by Justice
Brandeis, in effect leveled up: the state had to charge the plaintiff
corporations the lower rates because that is what their competitors
were charged; the alternative of compelling the competitors to pay the
higher rate was inappropriate.1
60
152. Id. at 557-58. The Court reached this conclusion after finding that the state's pro-
posed all-female alternative program, the Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership, was
not substantially equal to VMI. Id. at 554.
153. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
154. Id. at 536-37.
155. Id. at 542.
156. Id. at 541-42.
157. 284 U.S. 239 (1931).
158. Id. at 240-41. The Iowa statute at issue
impose[d] upon "state, savings and national bank stock and loan and trust com-
pany stock and moneyed capital," an ad valorem tax based upon twenty per cent.
of the actual value thereof, computed at the same rate at which tangible property
is taxed under the consolidated levy for local, county and state purposes.
Id. at 241. According to the statute, taxes of the same rate should have been levied on the
competing domestic corporations. Id. Instead, the taxes laid upon the competing domes-
tic corporations were at a rate of one-fifth to one-seventh of that levied on the petitioner
corporations. Id. at 242.
159. Id. at 241.
160. Id. at 247. Another early example of apparent judicial hostility to leveling down
might be Cumming v. Richmond County Board of Education, 175 U.S. 528 (1899), which re-
jected a challenge to the closing of the only high school for black children while high
schools for whites remained open. Id. at 545. The plaintiffs sought to force the closure of
the white schools, but the Court said that this "would only be to take from white children
educational privileges enjoyed by them, without giving to colored children additional op-
portunities for the education furnished in high schools." Id. at 544.
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If the Supreme Court had always leveled up in response to equal
protection violations, serious questions would have arisen about the
restrictive remedy in Bush v. Gore. The Court has emphasized, how-
ever, that there is no blanket rule requiring extension rather than re-
moval to cure unconstitutional inequality.161 Some cases have in fact
leveled down, and occasionally the Court has tried to finesse the
question.
Skinner is an early example of a type of remedial avoidance. Al-
though setting aside the sentence in that case, the Court offered no
view on whether the statute could be redrafted to avoid constitutional
objections by either expanding or shrinking the class of sterilization-
eligible criminals.1
6 2
Two gender discrimination cases also illustrate this kind of avoid-
ance. Stanton v. Stanton 6' invalidated a Utah law that established a
higher age of majority for males than for females-a law that made
sons eligible for child support until they were twenty-one whereas
daughters lost their entitlement at eighteen.' 64 After finding the dif-
ferential unconstitutional, the Court refused to decide on a cutoff age
and left that issue to the state.165 Similarly, Orr v. Ord66 struck down
an Alabama statute making only husbands, but not wives, liable to pay
alimony to their ex-spouses on divorce.' 67 Again, however, the Court
left it up to the state to decide whether to level up (by making either
spouse liable for alimony) or down (by making neither spouse
liable). 16
A good example of leveling down is Griffin v. County School
Board,'6 9 which involved a school district that was a defendant in
161. See, e.g., Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 738 (1984) ("We have never suggested
that the injuries caused by a constitutionally underinclusive scheme can be remedied only
by extending the program's benefits to the excluded class.").
162. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 543 (1942).
163. 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
164. Id at 8, 9.
165. Id. at 17-18. The Utah Supreme Court ultimately determined that the age of ma-
jority should be 18 for both males and females. Stanton v. Stanton, 564 P.2d 303 (Utah
1977). Meanwhile, the legislature amended the statute prospectively to the same effect.
See 1975 Utah Laws ch. 39, § 1. As a result, Sherri Stanton, the daughter on whose behalf
the case was brought, never got the additional child support she would have received had
she been her father's son. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Judicial Authority to Re-
pair Unconstitutional Legislation, 28 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 301, 323 (1979).
166. 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
167. Id at 283.
168. Id. The state courts leveled up. Orr v. Orr, 374 So. 2d 895, 897 (Ala. Civ. App.
1979).
169. 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
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Brown v. Board of Education.170 In Griffin, the local white authorities
closed the public schools to avoid a desegregation order and provided
both tuition grants and tax credits to support children attending the
whites-only private school that was established when the public
schools were shut down. 1 71 After finding that the closure of the pub-
lic schools violated the Equal Protection Clause, 172 the Court went on
to hold that it was "appropriate and necessary" to prohibit tuition
grants and tax credits that supported the segregation academy.17
Perhaps the most complete discussion of the remedial question
appears in Califano v. Westcott, 7 4 another gender discrimination case
involving a provision of the Social Security Act.' 75 Although the Jus-
tices unanimously invalidated the provision affording benefits to de-
pendent children whose fathers-but not their mothers-lost their
jobs,7 6 they divided 5-4 on the proper remedy. The majority leveled
up, concluding that children should be able to obtain benefits no mat-
ter which of their parents had become unemployed. 7 7 Four Justices
dissented on this point, arguing that only Congress could resolve the
momentous policy matters implicated by the dispute and that the leg-
islative branch less than a dozen years earlier had actually rejected the
approach embodied in the Court's decision. 178
The dissenters' reluctance to level up in the face of congressional
rejection of a similar proposal not very long before drew on Justice
Harlan's discussion in Welsh. 179 In Welsh, Justice Harlan suggested
that courts must consider the "intensity of commitment" and the "de-
gree of potential disruption" of underlying policies that would result
from alternative remedial approaches.1 8 0 Leveling up is appropriate,
he explained, if it can be done "without impairing other [governmen-
tal] goals."18
The majority in Bush v. Gore identified an important governmen-
tal goal as the reason for stopping the count rather than allowing it to
170. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
171. Griffin, 377 U.S. at 221-24.
172. Id. at 232.
173. Id. at 233.
174. 443 U.S. 76 (1979).
175. Id. at 78.
176. Id. at 89.
177. Id. at 90-91. The majority also rejected an alternative remedy that would have
made benefits available to children only if the parent was both unemployed and the fam-
ily's principal wage earner. Id. at 91-93.
178. See id. at 94-96 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
179. Id. at 94.
180. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 365 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
181. Id. at 366.
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proceed under proper standards: Florida's desire, articulated by the
Florida Supreme Court, to bring itself within the safe-harbor provision
of the Electoral Count Act.t 82 That provision immunizes from chal-
lenge the selection of presidential electors made at least six days
before the date established for the Electoral College to meet.183 In
2000, that deadline was December 12, the day of the Supreme Court's
ruling.'" 4 Because it was impossible to complete a proper count by
the deadline, the only proper remedy was to bring down the curtain
immediately. 185
This analysis is contestable on several points. To begin with, a
significant reason for the state's inability to complete the count was
that the majority had issued a stay that halted the count three days
before the case was decided.' 86 A quick response to this objection is
that an unconstitutional recount deserves no weight at all, and the
propriety of the counting standards was one of the crucial issues to be
resolved when the stay was issued.187 The stay is of peripheral signifi-
cance to the larger issue, though. Two other objections loom larger.
One is that the majority overstated the significance of the December
12 deadline, both to the Florida Supreme Court and to the statutory
scheme governing the Electoral College.' 88 Nothing in the Electoral
Count Act disqualifies a state's electoral votes if its electors are not
chosen within the safe-harbor period; that deadline merely prevents
their selection from being challenged "by judicial or other methods or
procedures."'189
182. Bush II, 531 U.S. 98, 110-11 (2000) (per curiam).
183. 3 U.S.C. § 5 (2000).
184. The Electoral College is required by statute to meet "on the first Monday after the
second Wednesday in December." Id. § 7. In 2000, that day was December 18.
185. See Bush II, 531 U.S. at 110 (per curiam).
186. See id. at 143 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); id. at 150 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Bush v.
Gore, 531 U.S. 1046 (2000) (per curiam).
187. This observation is not intended to resolve whether such an argument would justify
the issuance of the stay under the Court's customary standard. FourJustices saw nojustifi-
cation for the stay. See Bush, 531 U.S. at 1047-48 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For a defense of
the stay along the lines suggested in text, see POSNER, supra note 7, at 163-66 (explaining
that the harm which may result from an unconstitutional recount is a political harm for
which the courts do not have a remedy).
188. See Bush II, 531 U.S. at 143-44 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); id. at 155 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting); see also Issacharoff, supra note 15, at 71 (stating that the Court inappropriately
invoked the safe-harbor date because resolving the presidential election is a function of the
political branches); McConnell, supra note 8, at 118 ("As a matter of federal law, the De-
cember 12 date is not a strict deadline, but merely a 'safe harbor' date insulating electors
chosen by that date from congressional challenge.").
189. 3 U.S.C. § 5.
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The other objection is that the Florida Supreme Court might
have been dissuaded from issuing clearer counting standards due to
the discussion of Article II, Section 1 in Bush v. Palm Beach County
Canvassing Board,'9 ° which strongly implied that state courts had little
or no power to do anything that might be taken as revising state elec-
tion procedures. 91 Evaluating this objection is difficult because there
is no direct evidence bearing on the point.1 9 2 A conscientious judge
presumably would take the record as it appeared and ask whether
coming within the safe-harbor provision was of paramount impor-
tance to the Florida authorities. If the answer were yes, the next ques-
tion would have been whether it was possible to complete a proper
count by December 12.193
Even if these objections are cogent, there remains one other basis
on which a conscientious judge might have stopped the recount.
Some defenders of the result in Bush v. Gore have praised the decision
less for the cogency of its reasoning than out of a sense that the Court
saved the nation from a constitutional or political crisis.' 9 4 Critics,
including the dissenting Justices, have rejected this argument.1 9 5 Let
us consider, therefore, whether a conscientious judge might have
found such a pragmatic basis for stopping the count in Florida.
IV. AVERTING A NATIONAL CRisis
Assuming that the appropriate remedy was to remand for a count
using suitable standards, it is not clear that this task could have been
190. 531 U.S. 70, 76-77 (2000) (per curiam).
191. See GILLMAN, supra note 6, at 158-59; Balkin, supra note 10, at 1413; Strauss, supra
note 11, at 196.
192. The only data available are the opinions of the Florida Supreme Court. Its initial
ruling, which was vacated by the U.S. Supreme Court in a per curiam opinion containing
the not so veiled reference to Article II, was unanimous. Harris I, 772 So. 2d 1220 (Fla.
2000). Its second ruling was a 4-3 decision. See Harris II, 772 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 2000) (per
curiam), rev'd sub nom. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). The first paragraph of the major-
ity's legal analysis quoted Article II and the Electoral Count Act and explained: "We con-
sider these [state] statutes cognizant of the federal grant of authority derived from the
United States Constitution and derived from 3 U.S.C. § 5 .... " Id. at 1248. One of the
dissenters argued that the majority's recount order was unconstitutional because it contra-
vened Article II, Section 1. Id. at 1268 (Wells, C.J., dissenting).
193. Most observers agree that a full recount by December 12 would probably have been
impossible because of the December 9 stay. See, e.g., Bush II, 531 U.S. at 146 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
194. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 7, at 143-47; Sunstein, supra note 8, at 217-18;John C.
Yoo, In Defense of the Court's Legitimacy, in THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE, AND THE SUPREME COURT,
supra note 8, at 223, 225.
195. See, e.g., Bush II, 531 U.S. at 144 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); id. at 155 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting); Elizabeth Garrett, Leaving the Decision to Congress, in THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE,
AND THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 8, at 38, 53-54; McConnell, supra note 8, at 119-20.
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completed by the December 18 deadline when the Electoral College
was to meet.1 96 The dissenters in Bush v. Gore recognized this possibil-
ity t9 v and the difficulty that some county canvassing boards had ear-
lier experienced in finishing their work before the extended
certification deadline gives credence to this prospect.1 98 At the same
time, however, a proper count might have been done within a few
days. 199 What really matters is what would have happened next, re-
gardless of whether the recount was full or only partial.
The only certainty about what would have occurred next is that
Florida could not have enjoyed the protection of the statutory safe
harbor because its electors would not have been appointed within six
days of the Electoral College date. Beyond this lies the realm of
speculation.
First, the recount either would or would not have been finished
by December 18. Even if it were finished, the losing side might not
have accepted the result. If it were not finished, the parties might well
have argued over whether the partial recount could be used. Both
issues might well have wound up in court. Even with expedited proce-
dures, the result of the presidential election would remain uncertain.
Second, whatever the judiciary might have decided, the validity of
the Florida electoral votes would have been subject to challenge in
Congress under the Electoral Count Act.2 00 Indeed, the Bush v. Gore
dissenters and many critics believed that this was where the entire dis-
pute should have been resolved anyway.20 1 Let us therefore consider
what might have happened had the matter gone to Congress for ulti-
mate resolution.
Section 15 of the Electoral Count Act establishes the basic
ground rules. Section 15 provides that the electoral votes shall be
opened at ajoint session of Congress. Written objections, signed by at
least one Senator and one Representative, are allowed. Only if both
196. Richard H. Pildes, Democracy and Disorder, in THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE, AND THE SU-
PREME COURT, supra note 8, at 140, 147 (suggesting that it would have been nearly impossi-
ble to finish counting votes by December 18).
197. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 146 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
198. See, e.g., GiLMAN, supra note 6, at 70, 73-74 (explaining that the Miami-Dade Can-
vassing Board could not count all of the 654,000 ballots and were instead focusing on the
10,000 "undervote" ballots).
199. See, e.g., Klarman, supra note 9, at 1745 (stating that a recount most probably would
have been finished by December 18).
200. 3 U.S.C. § 15 (2000).
201. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 127 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 130 (Souter, J., dissenting);
id. at 144 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); id. at 153-55 (Breyer, J., dissenting); GILLMAN, supra
note 6, at 194-95; Garrett, supra note 195; Issacharoff, supra note 15, at 70-73; McConnell,
supra note 8, at 120.
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chambers, voting separately, agree to reject a state's electoral votes will
an objection be sustained. If two or more competing slates of electo-
ral votes are presented, the House and Senate, again voting separately,
must agree on which slate should be accepted. If the two chambers
disagree, then the slate certified by the governor of the state is to be
counted.2 °2
If the result of the further recount-whether complete or par-
tial-favored Gore, there would have been two competing sets of Flor-
ida electoral votes: one based on the recount, the other based on
Secretary of State Harris's certification of the original result.203 It is
conceivable that there might have been two separate gubernatorial
documents certifying the competing slates. Governor Jeb Bush had
signed papers, on the expiration of the extended deadline for Secre-
tary Harris to certify the vote, attesting that his brother had carried
the state. 214 Presumably he would have been asked to certify the re-
sults of the recount as well. If he complied, Congress would have had
to decide which of these documents embodied the certification "by
the executive of the State" that Section 15 deems controlling. 2 5 If he
refused to certify the recount figures, there might have been satellite
litigation over whether to hold him in contempt. Even without that
additional proceeding, Congress would have had to determine
whether there was a proper gubernatorial certification.
There is one last wrinkle to this hypothetical scenario. While
Bush v. Gore was working its way through the courts, the Florida legisla-
ture was preparing to hold a special session to adopt a resolution
awarding the Sunshine State's electoral votes to George W. Bush.206
This idea was based on Article II of the Constitution, which provides
that " [e] ach State shall appoint [its presidential electors] in such Man-
ner as the Legislature thereof may direct."20 7 That move would have
raised another series of daunting questions. For example, would a
retroactive legislative award of electoral votes have been consistent
with the constitutional language? There is no legal authority on this
202. 3 U.S.C. § 15.
203. See FLA. STAr. ANN. § 102.111(1) (West Supp. 2002) (amended 2002) (providing
that the Elections Canvassing Commission, composed of the Governor, the Director of the
Division of Elections, and Secretary of State, shall certify the election); id. § 102.141(4)
(amended 2002) (stating that an automatic recount is mandated when a candidate is de-
feated by one-half of a percent or less); id. § 102.168(1) (amended 2002) (stating that a
certification of election can be contested).
204. See GILLMAN, supra note 6, at 77.
205. 3 U.S.C. § 15.
206. See GILLMAN, supra note 6, at 71, 80, 107-08. The legislature abandoned this course
after the Supreme Court's ruling in Bush I.
207. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
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issue, so this step almost certainly would have provoked widespread
controversy. Even if it were constitutional, would the action preempt
congressional challenges? The answer is almost certainly no. The leg-
islative resolution would have been adopted on December 13 at the
earliest, which was only five days before the date for the Electoral Col-
lege to meet. Accordingly, the measure would not enjoy the safe-har-
bor protection reserved for the appointment of electors at least six
days before that meeting.20"
A conscientious judge might well have contemplated the possibil-
ity of at least two (and possibly three) different sets of electors from
Florida. It would have fallen to Congress to unscramble the situa-
tion.2 °9 The Congress that convened on January 6, 2001, would be
closely divided: the Republicans controlled the House by a narrow
margin, while the Senate was equally divided but effectively under
Democratic control with Vice President Gore in the chair. If the elec-
tion remained unresolved at that point, there was the prospect of
gridlock if both chambers, voting along party lines, disagreed over
how to allocate Florida's electoral votes.2 10 It is, of course, possible
that a few members would have transcended pure partisanship. 211 On
the other hand, party discipline was virtually unanimous during the
Clinton impeachment, an episode where the stakes were not as high
because the outcome would not have changed partisan control of the
executive branch. 212 In any event, the political maneuvering involved
in resolving the election might have prompted widespread suspicion
of corruption that would undermine the new chief executive. This
happened to John Quincy Adams and Rutherford B. Hayes after the
contested elections of 1824 and 1876, the latter of which inspired the
adoption of the Electoral Count Act.213
This bleak prospect was not the only plausible resolution of the
2000 presidential election. Those who regard a political resolution
with distaste might well regard politics as unacceptably disorderly and
in need of domestication by the judiciary.214 This view ignores Mr.
208. See 3 U.S.C. § 5.
209. See 3 U.S.C. § 15; McConnell, supra note 8, at 120.
210. See Sunstein, supra note 8, at 217-18.
211. See McConnell, supra note 8, at 120.
212. See PETER BAKER, THE BREACH: INSIDE THE IMPEACHMENT AND TRIAL OF WILLIAM JEF-
FERSON CLINTON 252, 409-10 (2000).
213. See generally PAUL C. NAGEL, JOHN QUINCY ADAMS: A PUBLIC LIFE, A PRVATE LIFE 288-
323 (1997); C. VANN WOODWARD, REUNION AND REACTION: THE COMPROMISE OF 1877 AND
THE END OF RECONSTRUCTION (rev. ed. 1966).
214. See, e.g., Pildes, supra note 196, at 162-63 ("The fear that democratic institutions
would be unable to secure their own stability, and the perceived need for constitutionally
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Dooley's famous observation that "[p]olitics... ain't bean bag,"215 as
well as our "profound national commitment to the principle that de-
bate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open."2 1 6 The selection of the President is a profoundly political act
with potentially significant implications for the direction of public pol-
icy. The process is necessarily messy, but it is not clear that the Su-
preme Court is more capable of sorting out those issues than is
Congress, which under both the Twelfth Amendment and the Electo-
ral Count Act has been given responsibility to unsnarl presidential
election disputes. 17
Nonetheless, a conscientious judge faced with the situation
before the Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore might well have believed
that shutting down the count on December 12 was a statesmanlike way
of preventing a prolonged national crisis. If this premise is correct,
then the weaknesses of the legal reasoning supporting the result
might be much less important to the judge than the long-term bene-
fits to the country accruing from the least messy resolution of the
election.
CONCLUSION
Events have begun to diminish the passions about Bush v. Gore.
Analyses of the ballots undertaken at the behest of various press out-
lets suggest that George W. Bush probably would have carried Florida
even if the Supreme Court had not stopped the count on December
12.21 s Moreover, the election was so close that numerous factors
other than those at issue in the Supreme Court could have changed
the outcome. For instance, Gore lost his home state of Tennessee and
the traditionally Democratic stronghold of West Virginia, either of
which would have given him enough electoral votes to propel him
imposed order, would be consistent with each of the Court's interventions into the
election.").
215. FINLEY PETER DUNNE, MR. DOOLEY: IN PEACE AND IN WAR, at xiii (1898).
216. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
217. See U.S. CONST. amend. XII; 3 U.S.C. § 15 (2000).
218. See, e.g., MERZER ET AL., supra note 15, at 167-68; Ford Fessenden &John M. Broder,
Study of Disputed Florida Ballots Finds Justices Did Not Cast the Deciding Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
12, 2001, at Al; Dan Keating & Dan Balz, Florida Recounts Would Have Favored Bush, WASH.
PosT, Nov. 12, 2001, at Al. Judge Posner anticipated this result in an earlier statistical
analysis. Richard A. Posner, Florida 2000: A Legal and Statistical Analysis of the Election Dead-
lock and the Ensuing Litigation, 2000 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 2-17. Ironically, the media-sponsored
studies suggested that Vice President Gore's best chance of carrying Florida was under
counting standards that were favored by Governor Bush's supporters and opposed by
Democrats.
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into the White House.219 In Florida, Gore lost approximately 26,000
votes in Duval County (Jacksonville) due to overvotes resulting from
confusing ballot instructions and several thousand more in Palm
Beach County due to the infamous butterfly ballot, a total that was
orders of magnitude larger than the margin by which he was found to
have lost in the Sunshine State.220
Those of us who are nonetheless troubled by Bush v. Gore should
put the case into perspective. The majority opinion is not a modern
analogue of Dred Scott v. Sanford.221 Unlike that ruling, there is a basis
on which a conscientious judge could have resolved the equal protec-
tion issue in Florida.2 22 Several important aspects of the reasoning
leading to the result are contestable, but few critics really disagree
with the principle underlying this aspect of the case. Regardless of the
sincerity of the Bush v. Gore majority, the per curiam opinion can be a
useful tool to promote electoral reform in the United States. We
should treat it as an opportunity that might not otherwise have come
along.
219. Zell Miller, The Democratic Party's Southern Problem, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2001, at A17
(stating that Gore lost "every state in the old Confederacy" and that if he had won any of
those states or "one more border state, he would be president today").
220. See GILLMAN, supra note 6, at 23, 231 n.34; MERZER ET AL., supra note 15, at 33-34,
37-38.
221. See DERSHOWITZ, supra note 7, at 173.
222. Professor Dershowitz thinks that Chief Justice Taney's opinion in Dred Scott was
defensible as a matter of principle, whereas Bush v. Gore is "uniquely corrupt." Id. at
173-74. That position is controversial, to say the least. See DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE
DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAw AND POLITICS 340-64, 367-88 (1978)
(providing withering criticism of Chief Justice Taney's Dred Scott opinion); see also Erik M.
Jensen, The Extraordinary Revival ofDred Scott, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (1988) (rejecting the
view that Chief Justice Taney's opinion can be defended on any principled ground).
